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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS
That discrimination by the federal government is prohibited has long been
recognized by the courts,' Congress, 2 and the executive branch of government. 3 The primary responsibility for insuring equal employment opportunity within the federal government, however, is vested in the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), 4 the federal government's employment agency. 5 Because of the Commission's failure to make any significant progress, Congress
in 1972 recognized the need for legislative action. 6 The result was the
1. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970), which provides in part:
It is the policy of the ,United States to insure equal employment opportunities
for employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
3. See Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1974), superseding Exec. Order No.
11,246, which provides in part:
Sec. 1. It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide
equal opportunity in Federal employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin

Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission shall provide leadership and guidance
to departments and agencies in the conduct of equal employment opportunity
programs ....
Sec. 4. The Civil Service Commission shall provide for the prompt, fair,
and impartial consideration of all complaints of discrimination in Federal employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Agency
systems shall provide access to counseling for employees who feel aggrieved
and shall encourage the resolution of employee problems on an informal basis.
Procedures for the consideration of complaints shall include at least one impartial review within the executive department or agency and shall provide for appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
4. See id. §§ 3, 4.
5. The CSC, established in 1883, is responsible for coordinating the federal personnel system, which each year processes over 200,000 new appointments. 5 UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL CIViL RIGHTS ENFORCE-

MENT EFFORT-1974, at 1 (1975).
6. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971). Statistics analyzed by the House Labor Committee indicated that in May 1970, although minorities
accounted for 19.4 percent of the total number of government employees and 14.4 percent of the general schedule employees, a substantial majority of these employees occupied positions in the lower levels of government. Minorities accounted for 27.3 percent
of all employees in grades GS-1 through GS-4, and 17.2 percent of all employees in
grades GS-5 through GS-8. Id. The committee concluded that "[t]hese figures represent little improvement over the statistics from the previous study done by the Civil Service Commission in November, 1969." id.
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enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 7 amending Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
Prior to the amendment, the only feasible procedure available to an
aggrieved federal employee required filing of a complaint with the agency
accused of discrimination. Both the House Labor Committee and the
Senate Labor Committee were highly critical of the complaint process,9 the
former indicating that it had "impeded rather than advanced the goal of the
elimination of discrimination in federal employment."' 1 Under the thenexisting procedures, each government agency was responsible for both
investigating and adjudicating internal charges of discrimination. Although
findings of fact and conclusions of law were made by an outside examiner
responsible for reviewing the complaint, these merely constituted recommendations to the agency head." Appeals from the final decision of the agency
were made to the Board of Appeals and Review of the CSC, which in effect
created a built-in conflict of interest. 12 These appeals rarely resulted in
reversals, and judicial relief was severely restricted by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.' 8 As noted in both the House and the Senate, federal
employees exhibited a strong lack of confidence in the complaint procedures. 1 4 The original congressional solution to these problems was to
transfer the primary responsibility for eliminating discrimination to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and to grant to an aggrieved employee or applicant the right to file a civil action in federal
court. 15 Under the original bill, if an employee or applicant were dissatisfied with an agency's final disposition of a complaint, he or she would be
permitted to file a civil action within 30 days after receiving notice of final
7. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1970).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
9. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra note 6, at 23-24; S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong.,
lst Sess. 14 (1971).
10. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra note 6, at 23-24.
11. 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.211-.222 (1975); S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 9, at 14.
12. Since the CSC had primary responsibility over all government personnel matters,
any decision on its part which upheld a finding of discrimination was in reality a criticism of the CSC's own equal employment program. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra
note 6, at 24; S.REP.No. 92-415, supra note 9, at 14.
13. See, e.g., Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969) (sovereign immunity precludes court review of decision by Board of Appeals and Review). But see
Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971), which held that Exec. Order
No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. § 207 (1974), provides a legal basis for awarding back pay to an
applicant for federal employment who alleges discrimination.
14. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra note 6, at 24; S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 9,
at 14.
15. See H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1971).
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action on the complaint. 16
Subsequent debate and legislative compromising, however, resulted in the
CSC's retention of responsibility for eliminating discrimination and an
increase in the enforcement powers of the Commission. 17 The employee
retained the right to file a civil action, but under somewhat different
circumstances. Subsections 717(c) through 717(d) of the amendment, as
finally enacted, provide as follows:
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by
a department . . . , or by the Civil Service Commission upon an
appeal from a decision or order of such department . . . on a
complaint of discrimination . . . , or after one hundred and eighty
days from the filing of the initial charge with the department . . .
until such time as final action may be taken by a department . . . .
an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final
disposition of his complaint, . . . may file a civil action as provided in section [706], in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
The provisions of section [706(f) through (k)], as applicable,
shall govern civil actions brought hereunder.' 8
As a result of this enactment, sovereign immunity is no longer a bar to
judicial relief. This jurisdictional grant, however, does not explicitly set
forth the manner in which federal courts are to exercise their jurisdiction.
Whether an aggrieved applicant or employee is entitled to a trial de novo in
federal court, or whether he or she is entitled only to a judicial review of the
administrative record, is a highly controversial issue in the area of civil rights
litigation. The circuit courts are in conflict, 19 paving the way to review by
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1970) provides in relevant part:
[he Civil Service Commission shall have authority to enforce the provim..
sions of subsections (a) . .. [i.e., that all personnel actions affecting employees
or applicants shall be made free from any discrimination] through appropriate
remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section, and shall issue such rules,
regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to
carry out its responsibilities under this section.
Concern with the existing backlog within the EEOC, as expressed in the minority views
on H.R. 1746, see H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra note 6, at 64, undoubtedly played a
major role in the decision to leave the enforcement responsibility with the CSC.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(c) to 16(d) (Supp. III, 1973).
19. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits have all held that a federal employee has an absolute right to a trial
de novo. Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975); Caro v. Schultz, 521
F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1975); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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the Supreme Court; 20 the final decision on this issue will have a substantial
impact upon the rights of the federal employee, as well as the federal judicial
system. In attempting to determine the extent of an aggrieved federal
employee's right to judicial review, an analysis of the statutory language of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, its legislative history, and more
importantly, the policy issues involved, is essential.
I.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE

1972

AMENDMENT

Section 717(c) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act specifies that
under certain circumstances, a federal employee "may file a civil action as
provided in section [706]."21 Under section 717(d) of the amendment,
"[t]he provisions of section [706(f) through (k)], as applicable,shall govern
actions brought . . . ." by federal employees. 22 Section 706(f) sets forth
the conditions under which a private sector employee may file a civil action
when the EEOC has been unable or unwilling to obtain or seek a voluntary
conciliation agreement with the alleged violator, as well as the procedures to
be followed by the district courts in such actions. 23 Although the EEOC
was given authority to issue cease and desist orders in the original legislative
proposal, 24 the final enactment conferred the ultimate power of enforcing
the Act's provisions on the courts. 25 Section 706(g) sets forth the relief that
a court may provide an aggrieved employee or applicant subsequent to a
finding of discrimination. 26 Under section 706(j), the parties are entitled
to appeal the district court's decision as provided under sections 1291 and
Contra, Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit
has held that a district court has discretion as to whether or not a complainant is entitled
to a trial de novo. Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted
sub nom. Chandler v. Roudebush, 96 S. Ct. 34 (1975).
20. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted sub nom. Chandler v. Roudebush, 96 S. Ct. 34
(1975).
21.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. ill, 1973), quoted p. 301 supra. Sections 706

(a)-(e), 42 U.SC. §§ 2000e-5(a) to -5(e) (Supp. III, 1973), set forth the administrative procedures to be followed by a private sector employee alleging discrimination.
Such employees may file their complaint with the EEOC, the federal agency responsible
for dealing with problems of discrimination in private enterprise.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)

(Supp. II,

1973)

supra.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. MI, 1973).
tion against the alleged violator.
24. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1971).

(emphasis added), quoted p. 301

The EEOC may also file a civil acSee pp. 300-01 supra.

25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Supp. III, 1973).

26. Id. § 2000e-5(g). This section enables the court to enjoin the employer from
engaging in an unlawful practice, as well as to order the reinstatement or hiring of the
aggrieved employee or applicant. Back pay may also be awarded. In addition, the court
may grant "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Id.
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1292 of Title 28.27 Similar provisions under the 1964 Act were construed
as granting the private sector employee the right to a trial de novo in the
district court.2 8 Indeed, the present provisions relating to private employees
29
have also been construed to require a de novo proceeding.
Those provisions of the amendment which are applicable to federal
employees, and the accompanying regulations,"0 seem to indicate that under
certain circumstances, an aggrieved individual is entitled to a de novo
proceeding in the district court. For example, a civil action may be filed
within 30 days after rejection or cancellation by the agency of the employee's
discrimination complaint. 8 ' 'Under such circumstances no administrative
record is compiled for judicial review; consequently, it would appear that a
record must be made in the district court. 3 2 Such a result would not
necessarily obtain, however. The court may choose to remand the complaint to the administrative agency upon finding that the agency erred in
rejecting or cancelling the complaint. In any event, the majority of instances
yield an administrative record and the proper scope of review thus becomes
the essential issue for resolution. Courts which have addressed the issue
hold conflicting views: some maintain that a federal employee has an
absolute right to a trial de novo in the district court;88 others hold that the
34
court has discretion as to whether or not a de novo proceeding is required;
still others imply that review is limited to the administrative record. 5 Many
27. Id. § 2000e-5(j). Sections 1291 and 1292 grant jurisdiction to the United States
courts of appeals for review of final decisions and certain interlocutory decisions of
the United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1971); Beverly
v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1971); Flowers v. Local
6, Laborers, 431 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cir. 1970).
29. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30. 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.201-.521 (1975).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. 1I1, 1973); 5 C.F.R. § 713.215 (1975).
32. In addition, if 180 days have elapsed since the filing of the complaint and the
agency has taken no action, a civil action may be filed. Id. § 2000e-16(c); 5 C.F.R.
§ 713.281(b) (1975). In this situation, also, a de novo proceeding would appear to be
necessary.
33. See note 19 supra. See also Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 379
F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1973);
Henderson v. Defense Contract Admn. Serv. Region, 370 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Griffin v. United States Postal Serv., 385 F. Supp. 274 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
34. See Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted sub nom.
Chandler v. Roudebush, 96 S. Ct. 34 (1975). See also Tomlin v. United States Air
Force Medical Center, 369 F. Supp. 353 (S.D. Ohio 1974); McCreesh v. Berude, 385
F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Jones v. Klassen, 389 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Mo. 1974);
Baca v. Butz, 376 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.M. 1974); Day v. Weinberger, 8 E.P.D.
9771 (D.D.C. 1974).
35. See Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975) (if trial court should
find need for additional facts, it may remand the matter to the agency); Russell v. John-
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of these varying opinions were based upon or supported by the statutory
language of the Act.
A literal reading of the term "civil action" indicates that Congress
intended to use the phrase as it is commonly used in the legal field-an
original action in which a trial de novo on the merits is conducted.3 6 Courts
denying employees an absolute right to a trial de novo, however, have not
adopted such a literal interpretation of the phrase. Concluding that the Act
is silent on the issue, they have applied traditional methods of statutory
37
construction, such as examination of the pertinent legislative history.
Since section 717(c) makes the provisions of subsections 706(f) through
706(k) applicable to civil actions filed by federal employees, and because
these same provisions have been construed as requiring a trial de novo for
actions brought by private sector employees, logic would seem to dictate that
a federal employee is entitled to a de novo hearing in district court. This
inference, however, was refuted in Baca v. Butz, 38 in which a district court
construed the "as applicable" language contained in section 717(d)39 as
indicating a congressional awareness of the substantial differences existing in
the procedures followed by federal employees and those of private sector
employees. To construe the statute to require a trial de novo, according to
the court, would be to confer greater rights upon the federal employee than
Congress conferred upon the private employee, affording the federal employee two adversary hearings. 'Under the amendment, only the "applicable"
provisions of subsections 706(f) through 706(k) govern federal employee
actions; given the extent of the administrative hearing available to federal
employees, the court believed that a right to a de novo hearing in federal
40
court was not an "applicable" provision.
The legislative history of the Act does indicate that Congress intended to
give federal and private sector employees equal rights. Yet granting a
son, 387 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv.,
388 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Md. 1975); Guilday v. United States Dep't of Justice, 385 F.
Supp. 1096 (D. Del. 1974); Handy v. Gayler, 364 F. Supp. 676 (D. Md. 1973).
36. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which Judge
Leventhal stated in a concurring opinion that ". . . it is more natural to consider a statute providing for 'an action' in the district court as one that permits a de novo presentation unless there is some other indication to the contrary." Id. at 180.
37. See, e.g., Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902, 903 (10th Cir. 1975).
38. 376 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.M. 1974).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), quoted p. 301 supra.
40. 376 F. Supp. at 1009. See also Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1252
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Although the district court's decision in Hackley has been reversed, other courts have
followed the reasoning set forth in the decision. See, e.g., Salone v. United States, 511
F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975). It therefore remains an important case.
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federal employee a trial de novo would not necessarily extend greater rights
to the federally employed than those afforded private sector employees. Such
a result would follow only if one assumes that the administrative hearing
conducted by the agency is in fact a fair adversary hearing with all the
rights and safeguards provided in federal court. A close examination of
41
existing CSC regulations establishes the contrary.
Given the state of the law with respect to private civil actions filed prior to
the 1972 amendments, it is apparent that if Congress did intend to restrict
the district court's role it would have done so in words clearer than the "as
applicable" provision of section 717(d).42 As the Third Circuit noted in
Sperling v. United States,48 prior acts of Congress restricting the scope of
review of the district courts have used specific language to do so.44 In
Hackley v. Roudebush,4 5 the District of Columbia Circuit pointed out that in
almost all of the instances in which the Act entitles a federal employee to file
a civil action, review of the aggrieved's claim by the administrative agency
precedes such filing.4 6 Given this situation, the Hackley court reasoned,
Congress would have used more affirmative language if it had intended to
47
restrict the district court's scope of review.
Courts allowing a de novo hearing have presented several additional
arguments rebutting the contention that the "as applicable" language has the
effect of restricting the scope of review of the district court. Sperling
indicated that the language could not restrict review since it was included in
a Senate bill 48 prior to the time in which the CSC was given any active role
in the federal employee complaint process. 49 The strongest argument,
however, is found in Hackley, in which the appeals court stated:
;[I]t seems most logical that the "as applicable" language expresses
a congressional recognition that the referenced subsections of sec41. See pp. 312-15 infra.
42. See Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 379 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Tex.
1973), in which the court noted that if Congress did not desire to allow a de novo trial,
"it would have so indicated since the specific words used in the statute merely refer the
government employee to the rights given to the employee in the private sector ....
Id. at 593. See also Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1974) ("... the
plain statutory language of the Act authorizes private actions without restricting the
forum court to a review of the administrative record," id. at 148, and ". . . this court
is without jurisdiction to amend the plain language of the Act." Id. at 149).

43. 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 475, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2347(a) (1970) (review of final administrative
agency orders); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) (review of agency adjudications).
45. 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

46. Id. at 120.
47. Id. at 120-21.
48. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 717(d) (1971).
49. 515 F.2d at 476.
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tion 706 [706(f) through 706(k)] also pertain to "civil actions" instituted by the EEOC and the Attorney General, and that language
in subsections 706(f) ,through (k) relating to such suits, as opposed to suits brought personally by private sector litigants, is
clearly not "applicable" to federal civil actions. 50
Such an interpretation is convincing in its logic, and its uniform adoption
would free the courts from the questionable practice of writing into the
statute a restriction which Congress apparently chose not to adopt.
Support for the de novo construction has also been found in the language
of sections 706(f) and 706(g) of the amendment. 5 Section 706(f)(4)
requires the chief judge of the judicial district in which the case has been
filed to appoint a district judge to "hear and determine the case."' 2 Section
706(f)(5) requires the appointed judge to assign the case for a hearing and
to schedule the case for trial.5 8 Section 706(g) empowers the district court
to issue an injunction if the court finds that the respondent was or is engaging
in an unlawful employment practice.5 4 Some courts have argued that the
emphasized words indicate that the trial court's role is not limited merely to
reviewing the administrative record, and consequently that a trial de novo is
required.55 Although the words "hear" and "trial" would seem to support
this contention, the words "determine the case" and "find" do not necessarily
mandate such a conclusion. A standard frequently applied by the courts in
reviewing administrative decisions is one in which the reviewing court
exercises its own independent judgment on the evidence contained in the
administrative record. 5 6 Under such a standard, reversal would be required
50. 520 F.2d at 119-20.
51. See Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 475 (3d Cir. 1975); Hackley v.
Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (4) (Supp. I1, 1973) (emphasis added).
53. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (5). The section provides in full:
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case
to be in every way expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for
trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined that judge
may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(emphasis added).
54. Id. § 2000e(5) (i). This section provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such . . . practice
(emphasis added).
55. See cases cited note 51 supra.
56. See Robinson v. Warner, 370 F. Supp. 828 (D.D.C. 1974); Bixby v. Pierno, 4
Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971). See also p. 318 infra.
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only if the administrative findings were not supported by the weight of the
evidence. The reviewing court makes the actual "determination" or "finding," but without the benefit of a de novo proceeding. Thus, such phrases
are not clear indicia of congressional intent to authorize a de novo trial. Still,
the language may be important in deciding the appropriate standard of
57
review, assuming that no trial de novo was intended.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

1972 AMENDMENT

When the statutory language of an enactment is ambiguous, courts
generally look to the statute's legislative history. At the outset, it must be
conceded that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act's history is full of
ambiguities and inconsistencies. Perhaps the most definite statement that
can be made about the legislative history is that congressional concern over
the CSC's failure to adequately reduce the occurrence of discrimination in
federal employment was explicit. 55
Courts analyzing the Act's legislative history have focused primarily upon
the statements of Senator Harrison Williams, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and co-sponsor and floor manager
of the relevant Senate proposal;5 9 those courts which have denied the federal
employee an absolute right to a de novo trial rely primarily upon his statements to the effect that the amendment provides the federal employee with
the right to file an action in district court for a "review of the administrative
proceeding record." 60 These statements were quoted by the district court in
Hackley v. Johnson6 ' to support the proposition that the district courts are
57. See pp. 318-19 infra.
58. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra note 6, at 23.
59. S. 2515, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
60. See 118 CONG. REC. 4922 (1972):
Finally, written expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved federal employee to file an action in U.S. District Court for a review of the administrative proceeding record after a final order by his agency or by the Civil
Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied with that decision.
Id. In the section by section analysis of the statute read into the record by Senator
Williams, he further stated that:
An important adjunct to the strengthened Civil Service Commission responsibilities is the statutory provision of a private right of action of review of the
agency proceedings in the courts by Federal employees who are not satisfied
with the Agency or Commission decision.
. . .Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and the courts has
also been in doubt. The provisions adopted by the Committee will enable the
Commission to grant full relief to aggrieved employees. . . . Aggrieved employees. . . will also have the full rights of review available in the courts.
Id. at 4923.
61. 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush,
520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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to exercise a supervisory role rather than the traditional role exercised in a
private civil action. The importance of these statements, however, was discounted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Sperling v. United States.6 2 In Sperling, the court observed that the phrase "review of agency proceedings" is not present in the Senate report from which
Senator Williams took the major portions of his analysis. 63 Judge Gibbons,
speaking for the court, stated that ". . . the analysis in the Senate Report
representing the consensus of the committee charged with studying the bill,
'6 4
more accurately reflects the congressional intent."
Another statement of Senator Williams which has caused much debate is
his contention that "[tihere is no reason why a federal employee should not
have the same private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private
sector . . . . "5 As noted above, both before and after the enactment of
the 1972 amendment private employees were entitled to a trial de novo in
district court. 66 The argument that there exist analogous rights among
private and federal employees, however, was rejected by the district court in
Pointer v. Sampson.6 7 In Pointer, the court noted that the original Senate
version of the amendments had vested the EEOC with the enforcement
responsibility for private sector employees.6 8 Under the original bill, the
EEOC was given the power to issue cease and desist orders, as well as to
order the reinstatement or hiring of an aggrieved employee or applicant.6 09
Review of the final determinations made by the EEOC was vested in the
United States courts of appeals and was limited to a determination of whether
the EEOC findings were supported by substantial evidence. 70 Thus, the
court reasoned that
these remarks [of Senator Williams] were addressed to the rights
of private employees as proposed in the parallel reformation of
EEOC procedures in the 1972 Act . . . . Thus, when statements
were made concerning the giving to federal employees the same
rights as private employees, it is evident that what was meant was

a court review of the record.

....

71

62. 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975).
63. See S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 9, at 16-17.
64. 515 F.2d at 480.
65. 118

CONG.

REC. 4922 (1972) (emphasis added).

66. See p. 303 supra.
67. 62 F.R.D. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. Id. at 693. See S. 2515, 92d Cong., IstSess. § 706(a) (1971).
69. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(h) (1971).
70. Id. A court of appeals could, however, in its discretion remand the case to the
EEOC for additional evidence upon motion by the parties involved.
71. 62 F.R.D. at 693.
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Although this contention has merit with respect to a statement included in
the Senate report which was issued in October 1971,72 its validity becomes
questionable in view of the statement of Senator Williams made during
congressional debate on February 22, 1972. 73 When Senator Williams
made his statement equating the federal employee's rights with those of the
private employee, the provision referred to by the court in Pointer had been
deleted by an amendment which contained no restrictive language with
74
respect to the scope of review by the courts.
In Hackley v. Johnson,75 the district court indicated that the legislative
history cannot be given its proper meaning unless it is "put in [its] proper
context." 76 Pointing out that Congress left to the CSC the primary responsibility for enforcing the Act as it applies to federal employees, the court stated
that
a fair reading of :the statute shows that the courts and the
Commission are to work together and complement one another's
weaknesses and strengths .

. .

. Viewing the Act and its history

broadly, Congress intended to guarantee access to the courts-"a
civil action"-to eliminate previous barriers but not to start the
77
process anew.
As discussed below, 78 however, the weaknesses of the CSC procedures are

many. Providing the federal employee with access to the courts does
eliminate the sovereign immunity obstacle. But mere access, absent the
right to present evidence and to have one's cause of action heard and
decided by an independent trier of fact, does not solve the federal employee's prior difficulty in obtaining a fair and impartial decision on his or her
complaint.
Certain remarks made by Senator Alan Cranston, another co-sponsor of
the Senate bill, have also been cited by the courts. 79 In analyzing the
sections dealing with federal employment, Senator Cranston stated:
72. See S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 9, in which it is stated that "[a]ggrieved [federal] employees or applicants will have the full rights available in the courts as are
granted to individuals in the private sector under Title VII." Id. at 16.
73. See p. 308 supra.
74. Amendment No. 884 to S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), submitted by Senator Dominick, reprinted in Subcommittee on Labor, Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
at 1499 (1972).
75. 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520
F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. '1973).
76. Id. at 1251.
77. Id.
78. See pp. 314-15 infra.
79. See, e.g., Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 480 n.72 (3d Cir. 1975).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 25:299

For the first -time [the EEO Act would] permit Federal employees
to sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases .

. .

. As

with other cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Federal district court review would be based on the agency
and/or CSC record and would not be a trial de novo.80
At first glance, a clearer statement of the legislative intent on the issue could
not have been made. This statement, however, was subsequently corrected
by Senator Cranston, who indicated that the word "not" had been misplaced
in the last sentence.8 1 As corrected, the statement reads:
As with other cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Federal district court review would not be based on the
agency and/or CSC record and would be a trial de novo. 2
The relative weight to be accorded this correction has been questioned. 3
The District of Columbia Circuit in Hackley v. Roudebush,8 4 however, noted
that the correction was not objected to by the Members of Congress to whom
it was addressed.8 5 The court noted, moreover, that the original version
is internally inconsistent.86 It was clear that civil actions brought under the
1964 Act were de novo proceedings8 7 and that Senator Cranston's original
statement was obviously comparing the rights of the federal employee with
the rights of the private sector employee as they existed prior to the 1972
amendments. Thus, the correction was necessary to give meaning to his original statement. Given this fact, a proper analysis of the legislative history
requires that the corrected version be afforded a high degree of credibility.
Portions of the legislative history manifest a congressional concern that
duplication of the administrative hearing would occur in the federal courts.88
80.

118 CONG. REC. S 2289 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972).

81. id.S 4929 (1973).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Because of
the anomalous nature of Senator Cranston's remarks we do not emphasize their importance ..
" Id. at 481 n.72).
84. 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
85. See id. at 148.
86.

Id.

87. See cases cited note 28 supra.
88. S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 9, states in part:

The committee is concerned, however, about the interplay between the newly
created enforcement powers of the Commission [EEOC] and the existing right

of private action.

It concluded that duplication of proceedings should be

avoided ....

m

. .[Mt is not the intention of the committee to permit an aggrieved party
to retry his case merely because he is dissatisfied with the Commission's action.
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This concern has been noted as supporting the contention that Congress did
not intend to allow a trial de novo. 9 It is significant, however, that the
original Senate bill to which this congressional concern was addressed
provided for court review in the courts of appeals under a "substantial
evidence" standard of review when the private sector complainant had
received a final order of the EEOC with which he or she was dissatisfied. 90
Under this standard, the courts of appeals had discretion over whether to
allow the party to produce additional evidence; even then, the case was to be
remanded to the Commission. 91 That this would prevent duplication cannot
be denied. Congress, however, subsequently deleted all references both to a
"substantial evidence" standard of review and to the courts of appeals. This
procedure was substituted with the present right to file a civil action in the
district court. In contrast to the original bill, the district court's role was not
specifically restricted in any way in the final version of the Act. As aptly
stated by the court in Hackley v. Roudebush:
Given the significance that Congress attached to the standard of
review, and the detail with which Congress specified procedures
governing such "review" problems as inadequate administrative
records and failure to present evidence before the agency, we believe Congress would have addressed these issues if a "review"
proceeding rather than a trial de novo in the district court was
92
intended.
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

As already indicated, certain courts have concluded that by granting a
federal employee a right to a trial de novo in federal court, the federal
employee would in effect be given two adversary hearings in which to
establish his case. This contention, if true, would weigh heavily against
granting the federal employee an automatic right to a trial de novo.
Because of the significance of this contention, a close examination of
current CSC regulations relating to the federal employee's administrative
remedies is warranted.
Once the Commission has issued an order, further proceedings must be in the
courts of appeals pursuant to subsections 706 (k)- (n).
Id. at 24.

89.
90.
91.
92.

See Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689, 694 (D.D.C. 1974).
S. 2515, 92d Cong., lst Sess. § 3 (1971).
See note 70 & accompanying text supra.
520 F.2d at 146. Accord, Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 379

F. Supp. 589, 593 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (if Congress did not want to afford the federal employee a trial de novo, it would have so indicated).
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CurrentAdministrative Procedures

Although each government agency is afforded the primary responsibility
for establishing regulations to insure prompt and impartial consideration of
employment complaints, 93 each agency must, at a minimum, comply with
the principles and requirements set forth in the Administrative Personnel
Regulations of the CSC. 9 4 These procedures are designed to encourage
informal solutions to employee grievances. Indeed, a prerequisite to the
filing of a formal complaint with the agency is that the matter must have
been brought to the attention of an EEO counselor within 30 days of the
action of which the employee or applicant complains.95
The EEO counselor makes an initial inquiry into the merits of an
aggrieved party's complaint, counsels the aggrieved, and attempts to obtain
an informal solution to the problem. The counselor must act promptly; if a
satisfactory solution is not reached within 21 days from the date the matter
was brought to the counselor's attention, the aggrieved must be advised of his
or her right to file a formal complaint. 96 Should a formal complaint be filed
and accepted by the agency, 97 the counselor must submit a written report to
the EEO officer of the agency, "summarizing his [or her] actions and advice
both to the agency and the aggrieved person concerning the issues in the
98
matter."
Once a complaint has been accepted, an investigator is appointed to
examine all aspects of the allegations of discrimination; the investigator may
be an employee of the agency under investigation, but he or she cannot
occupy a position in the agency which is "directly or indirectly under the
jurisdiction of the head of that part of the agency in which the complaint
arose." 99 The investigator, who has power to administer oaths and to
require that any statements by a witness be made under oath, must maintain
93. 5 C.F.R. § 713.203(k) (1975).
94. Id. H 713.212-.222.

95. Id. § 713.214(a)(i).
96. Id. § 713.213(a).
97. It should be noted that the agency may
reject a complaint which was not timely filed and shall reject those allegations
. . .which are not within the purview of § 713.212 or which set forth identical
matters as contained in a previous complaint filed by the same complainant
which is pending in the agency or has been decided by the agency.
Id. § 713.215. Section 713.212(b) provides that sections 713.211 to 713.222 do not apply to general allegations of discrimination unrelated to an individual complaint of discrimination. Such allegations are considered under id.§ 713.251.
98. Id. § 713.213(a). The EEO officer is an employee of the governmental agency,
designated by it to assist the agency head in carrying out the agency's program. Id.
§ 713.204(c).
99. Id. § 713.216(a).
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an "investigative file" which should contain all documents and information
obtained during the course of the investigation. 100 A copy of this file must
be submitted to the complainant at the close of the investigation, and the
agency must provide the complainant with an opportunity to adjust the
complaint on an informal basis with appropriate officials of the agency. 10 1
Once again, an informal solution is encouraged.
Once it is determined that an informal adjustment satisfactory to both the
complainant and the agency cannot be obtained, the complainant must be
notified of the proposed disposition of the complaint, as well as of his or her
right to a decision by the agency head, with or without a hearing, as he or
she may choose. 10 2 Hearings are presided over by a complaints examiner,
who generally must be an employee of another agency and certified by the
CSC.10 The complaints examiner regulates the course of the hearing by
administering oaths,104 ruling on offers of proof, 10 5 and deciding whether
or not a particular witness should be permitted to testify.' 0 6 Rules of evi-i
dence are liberally applied, and each party involved has the right to crossexamine witnesses, whose testimony is to be given under oath or affirma07
tion.'
After the hearing, the complaints examiner submits the complaint file and
record of proceedings, along with findings and recommendations, to the
agency head.' 0 8 The recommendations of the complaints examiner are not
binding upon the agency; the final decision is made by the agency head or
his designee.' 0 9 This decision, if not satisfactory to the complainant, may
100. Id.
101. Id. § 713.217(a).
102. Id. § 713.217(b). It has been suggested that construing the new amendment
so as not to allow a trial de novo in district court may encourage many employees or
applicants to waive a hearing, with the understanding that a hearing will be required in
district court. See Comment, Hackley v. Johnson, The Federal Employee's Right to
Trial De Novo Review of Civil Service Discrimination Determinations, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 206, 210 (1974). In Thompson v. United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974), however, the court held
that under such circumstances the plaintiff will have waived the right to a hearing and
will not be entitled to a hearing in district court.
103. If the agency in which the complaint arose is either the government of the District of Columbia or an agency which is prevented by law from revealing inside information to nonagency employees, the complaints examiner may be selected from that
agency. 5 C.F.R. § 713.218(a) (1975).
104. Id. § 713.218(d)(1).
105. Id. § 713.218(d)(3).
106. Id. §§ 713.218(c) (2), 713.218(e). Testimony which is irrelevant or repetitious
will be excluded. Id. § 713.218(c) (2).
107. Id. § 713.218(c)(2).
108. Id. § 713.218(g).
109. Id. § 713.221(a). The agency head or a designee (under id. § 713.204(c) the
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be appealed to the CSC. 110 There is no right to a hearing before the
Commission, but should the Appeals Board feel that further investigation is
warranted, it may remand the case to the agency for further investigation, or
conduct an independent investigation.' 1 ' If the final agency decision is
adverse to the complainant, sections 717(c) and 717(d)" 1 2 allow entry to
the federal judicial system.
Although referred to by one court as "comprehensive new regulations to
meet the concerns of Congress," 113 the prescribed mechanisms are in reality
14
a restatement of the procedures existing prior to the 1972 amendment.'
Essential deficiencies remain. The investigator may still be an employee of
the very agency which is under investigation. Although this may be
advantageous in terms of the efficiency of the investigation, 115 it may be
detrimental to the employee due to the inherent bias of such an investigator.
Moreover, the complaints examiner's findings and conclusions remain mere
recommendations to the agency head. Statistics indicate that in 1974, of the
643 cases which went to a hearing, the complaints examiner made a finding
of discrimination in 16.9 percent of the cases." 6 Agency review of these
findings reversed the complaints examiner in some 26.6 percent of the
cases. 1 7 Such statistics, although not conclusive, give some degree of
support to the contention that under existing CSC procedures, the federal
employee's right to an "impartial" hearing has been denied.
Another apparent defect in the administrative hearing is that the full rights
available under the liberal rules of discovery of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure"1 8 are not made available to the aggrieved employee. The
employee has no absolute right to subpoena documents or witnesses, alagency head is authorized to designate a Director of EEO to assist him in carrying out
the functions set forth in the regulations) may "adopt, reject, or modify the decision
recommended by the complaints examiner."

Id. § 713.221(b) (2).

If, however, the

complaints examiner's recommendations to the agency include a finding of discrimination, and the agency fails to act on said recommendation within 180 days from the date
of the original filing of the complaint, the recommended decision is binding upon the
agency. Id. § 713.220(d).
110. Id. § 713.231.
111. Id. § 713.234.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. III, 1973).
113.

Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom.

Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
114. Compare 34 Fed. Reg. 5367-71 (1969), with 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.201-.521 (1975).

115. Presumably, an employee of the agency which isunder investigation would have
greater knowledge of the internal structure of the agency than an outside employee, thus
making the investigation more efficient.
116. 5 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 79 n.272.
117. Id.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
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though the complaints examiner, in his discretion, may require the agency to
produce certain witnesses, if it is determined that the testimony is necessary.' 19 In addition, while the aggrieved still has a right to appeal an
unfavorable agency decision to the CSC, statistics have shown that reversals
are rare.

1 20

From an examination of the Act it is apparent that Congress retained the
CSC's jurisdiction over federal employee discrimination complaints with the
understanding that the CSC would adopt new regulations to alleviate the
apparent ineffectiveness of the procedures existing at the time of the
amendment's enactment. Courts denying the federal employee an absolute
right to a trial de novo have emphasized this fact in their decisions.1 2' Yet in
doing so, the courts have ignored the reality of the present regulations and
their effect upon the federal employee's rights under the statute. 12 2 It may
nevertheless be argued that the failure on the part of the CSC to live up to
the expectations of Congress does not alter the congressional intent on the
issue of the federal courts' role in eliminating discrimination. Such a factor,
however, is a significant policy consideration that should not be ignored by
the courts.
B.

The Duplication Issue

Numerous courts have expressed concern over the impact which a mandatory trial de novo would have upon the federal judicial system.' 23 Other
courts, however, have determined that such a holding would not necessarily
result in either a substantial burden on the federal courts, or unnecessary
119. See 5 C.F.R. § 713.218(c) (1975).
120. See 5 UNITED STATES COMMISSION

ON CIVIL RIGHTS,

supra note 5, at 81-82.

The Commission discloses that:
In fiscal year 1974, approximately 30 percent of agencies' final dispositions of
complaints were appealed to the Appeals Review Board. In approximately 75
percent of these cases, the agency decision finding no discrimination or rejecting the complaint was affirmed. In slightly more than 10 percent of the cases,
the Board remanded the complaint to the agency for further investigation, and
in approximately 7 percent the appeal was cancelled by the complainant. The
Board reversed agencies' rejections of complaints and findings of no discrimination in 5.5 percent of the total decisions rendered.
Id.
121. See, e.g., Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1975) (adopting
reasons set forth in Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973)); Pointer
v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689, 693-94 (D.D.C. 1974); Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp.
1247, 1250-51 (D.D.C. 1973).
122. See, e.g., Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
123. E.g., Ficklin v. Sabatini, 383 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Hackley v.
Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub noma. Hackley v. Roudebush,
520 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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duplication; rather, the evidence adduced at the trial de novo would
supplement the administrative record. 1 24 The recent Supreme Court decision
of Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.'2 5 supports the latter proposition.
InAlexander, a private sector employee, pursuant to the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement between his union and his
employer, submitted his claim of discrimination to arbitration. Dissatisfied
with the results of the arbitration process, he filed a civil action in federal
district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the basis of the arbitration decision. 126 The Supreme Court,
in reversing the district court's decision, stated that "[i]n instituting an action
under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's
decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the
arbitration process.' 127 Although the Court held that the federal court must
consider the employee's claim de novo, it indicated that the arbitration decision could be admitted as evidence and "accorded such weight as the court
deems appropriate.' 128 The Court was reluctant, however, to set forth any
standards as to the weight to be given the arbitration decision, indicating that
the decision "must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the
129
facts and circumstances of each case.'
The Alexander Court did suggest several possible factors that may be
considered inexercising such discretion: the degree of procedural fairness in
the arbitration forum, the adequacy of the record with respect to the discrimination issue, and the special competence of the arbitrator who heard the
case.180 Such factors would also provide guidance in determining the
relative weight to be afforded the final agency decision on the federal
employee's complaint. Under existing CSC regulations, the fact that the
usual rules of evidence are liberally applied, that discovery islimited, and
that compulsory process isunavailable would all tend to detract from the
procedural fairness of the administrative hearing and thus reduce the weight
to be accorded the agency's final decision. On the other hand, the fact that
testimony is given under oath and subject to cross-examination tends to add
to the weight to be accorded the decision.
The circumstances of the person rendering the final decision around which
124. See, e.g., Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Jackson
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 379 F. Supp. 589, 594 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

125. 415 U.S.36 (1974).
126. 346 F.Supp. 1012 (D.Colo. 1971).
127.
128.
129.
130.

415 U.S.at 54.
Id. at 60.
Id. n.21.
Id.
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the controversy revolves would also be relevant to the issue of the weight to
be afforded the decision. For example, the decision of the complaints
examiner should be afforded greater weight than the final decision rendered
by the agency head, since the complaints examiner would have been present
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, would be more likely to be
impartial, and presumably would be expert in the area of employment
discrimination.
As noted by the District of Columbia Circuit in Hackley, there may be
some situations in which the administrative record itself provides a sufficient
basis for granting a motion for summary judgment, thus avoiding a de novo
proceeding altogether.' 3 ' Such a procedure, if followed, would have a
twofold effect: it would avoid much of the duplication feared by courts, and
it would place pressure upon the CSC to enact new regulations insuring the
adequacy of the administrative hearing and the elimination of actual or
apparent bias in the final decision. Presumably, improvements in the latter
area would result in the district court placing increased emphasis upon both
the final administrative decision and the administrative record itself, if
admissible. 1 32 ,It is also conceivable that a substantial improvement in the
administrative procedures would result in fewer federal employees bringing
their cases to court. As the discrepancy between the relative advantages of
bringing an action in federal court and exhausting one's administrative
remedies is reduced, it would seem to follow that the advantages of pursuing
a cause of action under section 717(c) would also be substantially reduced,
thereby reducing court congestion.
IV.

THE

APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IF No TRIAL

DE Novo Is

REQUIRED

Those courts which have denied the federal employee a trial de novo as a
matter of right are in disagreement as to the proper standard to be applied
by the court in reviewing the administrative record. Previously, in the area
of federal employee discharge cases, the court's role was limited to an
analysis of whether there had been a departure from the required standard
of due process. 13 3 Under Title VII case law, however, the courts are
divided as to whether to reverse the administrative decision only if it is
131. 520 F.2d at 157.

Accord, Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 483 (3d

Cir. 1975).
132. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 156-57 n.195 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (transcript itself may be admissible under rule 803(6) or 803(8) (B) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
133. See, e.g., Rosenman v. Levbarg, 435 F.2d 1286, 1287 (3d Cir. 1970); Chiriaco
v. United States, 339 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1964).
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unsupported by "substantial evidence,"'1 34 or whether to require that the
administrative record affirmatively establish the absence of discrimination by
a clear preponderance of the evidence.' 3 5 If it is concluded that a trial de
novo is not required as of right, the courts should employ the latter standard.
In California, the proper scope of review to be exercised by a court
reviewing a decision of an administrative agency is determined by the nature
of the right affected. 136 If the administrative decision involves or substantially affects a "fundamental vested right," the trial court both examines the
administrative record for errors of law and "exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo."'1 37 The
"substantial evidence" standard of review is applied to those cases not
involving or affecting "fundamental vested rights."'1 38 In determining
whether a given right is fundamental, the California courts weigh both the
economic importance of the right to the individual, and the effect of the right
"in human terms and the importance of it to the individual in the life
situation."' 8 9 Although this analysis is based upon a construction of a
California statute, 40 its rationale is applicable to the construction of section
717(c) of the 1972 amendments. Because of the fundamental nature of the
rights involved, the construction of the Act mandating an independent
appraisal by the district court of the evidence established in the record
should be the minimum required standard of review.
134. See Russell v. Johnson, 387 F. Supp. 931, 934 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (unless the
agency or CSC holding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not supported by substantial evidence, it will not be altered by the district court); Tomlin v. United States Air Force
Medical Center, 369 F. Supp. 353, 357 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (reversal required only if
agency acted in arbitrary manner); Handy v. Gayler, 364 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D. Md.
1973) (court not authorized to reverse unless it finds the administrative decision arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence).
135. See Guilday v. United States Dep't of Justice, 385 F. Supp. 1096, 1102 (D. Del.
1974) (absence of discrimination must be established by preponderance of the evidence); Day v. Weinberger, 8 E.P.D.
9771 (D.D.C. 1974) (once aggrieved brings
forth any proof suggestive of discrimination, government must disprove by clear weight
of evidence); Jones v. Klassen, 389 F. Supp. 406, 407 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (if absence of
discrimination is supported by clear preponderance of the evidence in the administrative
record, no trial de novo).
136. See Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
137. Id. at 143, 481 P.2d at 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (footnote omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 144, 488 P.2d at 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
140. CAL. CODE OF CIv. P. § 1094.5 (West 1955) provides in relevant part:
(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in
cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines
that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence; and in all
other cases abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.
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V.

CONCLUSION

With the federal government currently employing some 2.9 million people,141 it is important that it take the initiative in eliminating employment
discrimination. Yet the government should not be permitted both to investigate and to judge itself with respect to how well it has achieved the goal of
eliminating discrimination. The United States Commission on Civil Rights
recently called for the creation of a new government agency, replacing the
EEOC, and having final authority over the CSC. 42 It does not appear,
however, that such an agency will be created in the near future. Until
Congress decides to effect changes, the federal employee, the federal government, and the judiciary must utilize the existing procedures provided by the
1972 amendments in moving toward the goal of eliminating discrimination.
Construing the Act to accord a federal employee a trial de novo would tend
to alleviate the present obstacles to having his or her case fully considered by
an independent tribunal. The CSC, however, should take notice of the
defects in the current administrative procedures, and should enact new
regulations so as to fulfill its responsibilities under the 1972 amendment.
And the courts, as noted by the Supreme Court in Alexander, ".
should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it
necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of the courts to assure the full
availability of this forum."'1 4 3 Only then will the courts and the CSC be able
to efficiently work together toward the goals set forth by Congress in Title
VII.
William A. Denman

141. See 5 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 1.
142. See The Washington Post, July 16, 1975, at A2, col. 1.
143. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.

